As if to underscore the point, the E.U. released its first-ever blueprint for updating the continent’s sagging defense industrial base, outlining ways for nations to overhaul production lines and buy weapons from neighbors as well as stepping up their joint defense planning. Nearly two-thirds of all European-made weapons are purchased only by the country where they are manufactured, McKinsey reported last year, a predictable but costly inefficiency. At the same time, E.U. nations moved forward with plans to spend the interest on roughly $300 billion in frozen Russian assets to help pay for other Ukraine-bound weapons. Washington has been nudging E.U. nations to consider the approach since last fall and, at roughly $3 billion a year, some nations appear ready to do so.
But even if these initiatives are all successful, the road to heightened European security will be long and difficult. While NATO reported in February that 18 of its 32 members will spend 2 percent of their GDP on defense in 2024 (a huge advance from five years ago) several of the richest nations — France, Germany and Canada, for example — struggle with that goal and with years of underfunding their militaries.
Since the end of the Cold War, most Europeans have remained fiercely opposed to paying for more security. The result is that NATO infantry units are overstretched, combat ships are understaffed and defense ministries often cannibalize equipment from one unit to get another ready to deploy. Britain has committed to provide one heavy armored division to NATO in the event of a crisis, but a recent House of Commons report suggested it could not deploy at full strength unless another country provided a third of the force. Germany has pledged to station a brigade of troops in Lithuania; some Bundeswehr soldiers are there but the unit won’t be fully combat-ready until 2027.
Recruitment and retention for what are mostly volunteer forces is a vexing challenge (just as they are in the United States) and ammunition and spare parts shortages are common. Some of the largest NATO countries buy their weapons year by year, rather than with more economical long-term contracts, which makes both front-end research and back-end maintenance harder. And shipments of available weapon stockpiles to Ukraine since 2022 have deepened NATO’s readiness problems.
The United States has guaranteed Europe’s security for the past 75 years. Partly as a result, no other Western nation can afford to conduct sustained, complex military operations far from home. But NATO does not need every member nation to be a bristling, multi-mission superpower. NATO — newly bolstered by formidable militaries in Sweden and Finland — is designed to mount a collective defense. Individual countries have excellent specialties: the Dutch excel at special operations; the Norwegians are the world’s best at underwater operations. U.S. officials praise the Carl Gustaf, an 84mm recoilless rifle made by Sweden’s Saab Bofors that is, said one, “cheaper and better than anything we have.” A British-Swedish system, the NLAW close support weapon, has been credited with helping Ukraine destroy a third of Russian armor. Poland will spend 4 percent of its GDP on its military this year; its navy has been credited with helping Ukraine destroy large numbers of Russian tanks.
Washington needs to make its own overdue adjustments in how it buys weapons, such as investing more in uncrewed ships and aircraft, modernizing its shipyards, and buying inexpensive drones and drone countermeasures like those in action over Ukraine. The good news is that, after years of dismissing the problem, Europe is now beginning to tackle its military to-do list. Alliances work best when all parties make the most of their strengths — and act together to address their shared weaknesses.
Credit: Source link
