Michael Kugelman is a leading specialist on Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan and their relations with the United States.
The editor or co-editor of 11 books, he has written for The New York Times, Foreign Policy, Foreign Affairs and other publications, covering topics ranging from US policy in Afghanistan to terrorism to water, energy and food security in the region.
In a recent interview with The Business Standard he spoke about US policy towards the upcoming national elections in Bangladesh, its future consequences, how labour rights play into it and the role of regional actors.
How do you expect the US and its European allies to react if the 7 Jan elections go ahead without the participation of BNP and its allies?
I imagine the reaction will depend on what happens in the critical weeks before the election. If the AL makes good faith efforts to give the opposition a strong incentive to participate in the elections—such as by freeing jailed opposition leaders, easing up on crackdowns, offering full support for dialogue with the opposition with no conditions—if it takes such steps and the opposition still boycotts, then the AL would likely not take much heat from the US and its allies.
But, if the AL keeps arresting opposition members, refuses to free opposition leaders in jail, maintains its broader crackdown, and on the whole gives the opposition little incentive to participate in the elections, then the reaction would likely be strong and critical from the West.
Washington and its European allies don’t expect the AL to give in to the BNP’s core demand of a caretaker, but they will watch to see if other steps are taken that give the BNP more of a reason to participate in the elections. If those steps aren’t taken, their reaction to the election will likely not be positive.
What remains to be seen is what impact these potential reactions could have on the policies of the US and its European allies toward Bangladesh. At this point, that is difficult to predict.
Why do you think the US has been far more engaged in ensuring free and fair elections in Bangladesh this time around than they were in 2018 and 2014?
This is the question everyone’s asking, and it’s the one I received more than any other during my trip to Dhaka several weeks back. And for good reason. Washington’s robust focus on democracy in Bangladesh stands out in a big way, especially in contrast to its current policies in India and Pakistan.
I think the answer lies in how the US frames its relationship with Bangladesh. On the one hand, the US accords more strategic significance to Bangladesh now than it did in 2018 or 2014, meaning that it takes more of an interest in, and has a greater stake in, democracy and free elections than in previous years.
Why the greater focus on Bangladesh now? Trade and investment have picked up in a big way, and the launch of the US-Bangladesh Business Council in 2021 was a big boost.
Great power competition and the China factor are key as well. US policy documents explicitly identify Bangladesh as a part of Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategy. US officials now describe the relationship with Bangladesh as a strategic partnership—something we didn’t hear until relatively recently.
But on the other hand, the US doesn’t put Bangladesh in its upper echelon of partners. It doesn’t view Bangladesh as an ally or top strategic partner, as it does, for example, India.
This means that the relationship isn’t so crucial that the US can’t risk jeopardising it by pushing hard on the rights and democracy front.
So in effect, for Washington, Bangladesh occupies a middle ground on the strategic significance spectrum—significant enough to warrant US concern about rights and democracy, but not so significant that the US feels a need to avoid democracy promotion actions to make sure the relationship stays strong.
In your view, what are the big drivers behind the current US policy towards Bangladesh?
With all the focus on US rights and democracy promotion and the tensions that’s caused for US-Bangladesh relations, it’s easy to forget that this relationship has gained ample strength in recent years, in great part because the partnership has grown increasingly multifaceted.
Trade and investment continue to be a sweet spot of the partnership, but we are also seeing growing cooperation in spaces from cooperation to maritime security. The US decision to consider Bangladesh a part of its Indo-Pacific strategy has helped fuel these collaborations.
Indeed, geopolitics is a key driver of US policy. Washington increasingly views its relationship with Dhaka (and many other South Asian capitals) through the lens of great power rivalry. It seeks to strengthen relations with Dhaka in part to reduce both Bangladesh’s reliance on China and Beijing’s influence over Dhaka.
Given these strategic goals, it might appear misguided to be pressing Dhaka on the democracy front, given the risk that this could push Bangladesh closer to China—though the close relationship between the AL and India’s ruling BJP likely functions as a deterrent against such a scenario.
Either way, another reason why the US may be emphasizing rights and democracy in its Bangladesh policy is a desire to link those issues to the principles and rules undergirding the US vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.
How do you view the mounting international pressure on the Bangladeshi RMG industry to ensure labour rights and what the timing of this pressure says about its link to the larger political situation?
My understanding is that in recent months the US has had some productive and encouraging discussions with Bangladesh on labour rights. But clearly, they remain a concern for Washington.
The US does have potential leverage in this area. The Obama administration’s decision to suspend GSP privileges a decade ago hasn’t hurt Bangladesh’s economy. However, if the Biden administration were to punish those that undermine labour rights in Bangladesh—and the administration has said in recently announcing its new global labour rights policy that sanctions, trade penalties and visa restrictions are all on the table—that could have a considerable economic effect, given that the US remains Bangladesh’s top destination for garments, and for exports on the whole.
I wouldn’t read too much into the timing of mounting pressure on the Bangladeshi RMG industry. In the US at least, this pressure is tied to a broader global campaign to promote more robust labour rights.
It’s likely coincidental that the Biden administration happened to announce its new policy, again a global policy on labour rights, this month, just after Bangladesh’s election date had been formally announced and the political environment was growing increasingly tense.
How much leverage does India have in terms of influencing US policy towards Bangladesh?
India’s views of US policy toward Bangladesh have been known to the US for months, and the US has pursued its policy of publicly pushing for rights and democracy—which New Delhi prefers Washington not do—for many months. This suggests limits to Indian leverage.
Also, the letter sent by Donald Lu to different political parties in Bangladesh was issued soon after the latest US-India 2+2 meeting, which featured discussions on Bangladesh. If New Delhi wants the US to play less of a role in Bangladesh’s domestic politics, then Lu’s letter suggests it didn’t get what it wanted.
That said, while India’s leverage over US policy in Bangladesh may be limited, one shouldn’t overlook India’s influence, given the high levels of strategic significance that the US accords to its relationship with India. New Delhi is by far Washington’s closest partner in South Asia, and the US will listen carefully to Indian views about Bangladesh.
In this regard, one can’t discount India’s capacity to convince the US to hold off on making an even bigger push for rights and democracy in Bangladesh. It’s notable that the US has not made any new announcements of sanctions or visa restrictions over the last few weeks, even though political unrest has increased in Bangladesh since BNP protests turned violent late last month, resulting in fresh crackdowns on the opposition.
It may just be that the US has decided on its own to step back, at a moment when the elections are drawing closer and the political moment is especially volatile. But the key data point—senior US and Indian officials met in New Delhi very recently and discussed Bangladesh—shouldn’t be overlooked.
If there is a change in the US government in the 2024 elections, do you think policy decisions taken before and after the Bangladeshi elections are likely to change?
That’s hard to say, as there are many unknowns at this point. A change of government would likely mean a Republican administration once again led by Donald Trump, though we don’t know. But I do assume if the Republicans return to the White House, no matter who is president, the US policy could change.
Both Democratic and Republican administrations have prioritised democracy-promotion-focused foreign policies in the past (most recently the Carter and Clinton administrations for the Democrats and the George W Bush administration for the Republicans), but I don’t think the Republicans would have an interest in that today.
Trump is certainly not interested in values-based foreign policies—and he would likely be receptive to Indian views that the US shouldn’t pursue one in Bangladesh.
A new US government could well translate to a different type of policy in Bangladesh—one focused less on values and more on interests, including trade (Trump famously said on the David Letterman show some years ago that he likes “Made in Bangladesh” shirts) and partnership around the Indo-Pacific strategy.
That said, both of those areas could face challenges, given Trump’s hard line on trade and on China, which could lead to new forms of pressure on Bangladesh.
But let’s not get ahead of ourselves—there’s still a year to go before the US election.
How do you view the US position on Bangladesh compared to US policy towards other countries in general, for eg, Pakistan?
It stands out, in that the Biden administration has made Bangladesh a prime focus of its values-based foreign policy. The administration has taken strong stands on democracy and rights in its policies toward pariah states—Myanmar, North Korea—and rivals—China, Russia, Iran.
But Bangladesh is neither a pariah state nor a US rival. It’s in fact a strategic partner, albeit not on the level of India.
The US position on Bangladesh, compared to its position toward other countries, is a function of how it categorises its relationship with Bangladesh. As I said before, in US thinking, Bangladesh occupies a middle ground—strategic enough to warrant concern and a focus on rights and democracy, but not so strategic that the US will tread carefully and avoid pressure.
India, given its envisioned role working with the US to counter China, gets free passes from Washington on rights and democracy (though the US does convey its concerns privately to Indian interlocutors).
The US views Pakistan as less strategically significant than India, but it still has a strategic interest in maintaining workable relations with a politically powerful Pakistani military that’s not known for embodying democracy. This holds Washington back from making more of an issue of rights and democracy in Pakistan—though in the past it has taken steps to try to strengthen civilian institutions there.
I’ll end on this note—for all the talk about strategic considerations and interests, there could also be additional and simpler explanations for the US policy in Bangladesh. Longstanding and unresolved concerns about rights and democracy, a strong passion for pursuing democracy—there are various motivations that could be driving the thinking of those who happen to be conducting US policy in Bangladesh.
There are many possible variables at play, and not just those tethered to strategic considerations.
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